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Abstract 
The rural areas of the United States have experienced a proliferation of quasi-
governmental institutions over the past three decades. The formation of such 
institutions represents an important form of local boundary change. Local boundaries 
determine service delivery, economic development, and intergovernmental 
relationships. It remains unclear, though, how the process of boundary change 
unfolds. Using federal and state data, I examine the ability of four general 
explanations of boundary change to account for the proliferation of economic 
development corporations across North Dakota and South Dakota. I find that their 
creation is not driven by economic change or need, but is more associated with 




State and local governments want to create an environment that encourages new business 
investments, but they are leery of implementing developmental policies that would increase the 
general tax burden.  This desire for economic growth at a low public cost has led to the 
proliferation of quasi-governmental institutions, which typically fund themselves through some 
means other than a direct tax upon all citizens (Sagalyn 2007)
1
.  Previously esoteric entities such 
as business improvement districts have become commonplace (Morcol and Zimmerman 2006)
2
, 
nearly every state allows the creation of tax increment financing districts to promote private 
development (Byrne 2006)
3
, and the proliferation of dependent and independent special districts 
continues at a rapid pace (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2002)
4
.  States have also greatly expanded 
the use of enterprise zones and tax abatement programs in hopes of attracting economic growth 
to their most distressed areas (Greenbaum 2004)
5
. 




One of the most prevalent quasi-governmental institutions to arise in recent years is the 
economic development corporation.  Legal definitions vary by state, but economic development 
corporations (EDCs) are generally non-profit corporations organized and overseen by 
representatives of business, local government, and the public (Wisconsin State Code 2006)
6
 in 
hopes of improving the economic situation of a specific municipality (Texas State Code 2006)
7
 
or region (Kansas State Code 2006)
8
.  EDCs pursue such strategies as publicizing local business 
opportunities, providing low-interest loans to businesses, encouraging new employment 
opportunities, making previously-neglected neighborhoods more attractive, and creating regional 
development plans.  EDCs are funded through a number of sources, including membership dues 
and contributions from participating businesses and governments (North Dakota State Century 
Code 2008)
9
, income derived from loan payments and service charges (New Mexico State Code 
2006)
10
, and the implementation of specially designated sale taxes (Texas State Code 2006)
11
. 
Logically, the creation of quasi-governmental institutions such as business improvement districts 
and economic development corporations should be driven by local need.  Depressed areas with 
inadequate tax bases are the natural beneficiaries of such institutions.  However, the available 
research suggests caution before accepting this conclusion (Greenbaum 2004)
12
.  Indeed, Burns 
(1994)
13
 presents evidence that new governmental institutions are often created by private 
entrepreneurs seeking to benefit themselves rather than the general public.  Focusing upon the 
formation of cities and special districts, Burns asserts that entrepreneurs who successfully 
instigate and complete the process of incorporation are well-positioned to institutionalize their 
own values within the new unit, such as a predilection for low taxes or the provision of certain 
services.  These findings serve as a basis for the subsequent study of local boundary change 
(Foster 1997
14
; Feiock and Carr 2001
15
). 
Unfortunately, the U.S. Bureau of the Census excludes economic development corporations from 
its Census of Governments tabulations and only a few states follow their day-to-day activities.  
As a result, academic research regarding EDCs remains quite limited (Olberding 2002)
16
.  This 
study seeks to derive a better understanding of economic development corporations through an 
examination of their uneven proliferation across North Dakota and South Dakota.  These two 
states have been selected for analysis due to their limited governmental resources as well as the 
stark contrast between the economic prospects of their rural counties versus their more urban 
counties.  Both states also experienced a rapid growth in EDC numbers at nearly the same time.  
The study uses negative binomial distributions to test whether economic conditions drove EDC 
proliferation during the 1980s and 1990s or if other, more political, considerations were at work.  
The study relies upon local boundary change theory to give shape to its analysis.  
Explanations for Local Boundary Change 
A theoretical perspective that focuses upon the boundaries of local governments may seem rather 
narrow until one realizes that “...boundaries determine who is included within a jurisdiction and 
define local arrangements of service provision and production, patterns of economic 
development, and the exercise of political power” (Feiock and Carr 2001, 383)
17
.   From this 
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perspective, then, it is the shared or overlapping boundaries between governments that set the 
initial parameters for intergovernmental relationships within a county or metropolitan area.  One 
government‟s sudden decision to extend its boundaries represents not just an expansion of its 
service delivery responsibilities and tax base, but a noteworthy projection of political power as 
well.  Likewise, the creation of a new government or quasi-governmental organization alters the 
local equilibrium.  Other governments may react by reevaluating their relationships with one 
another or creating their own quasi-governmental organizations, which can lead to the eventual 




).  Exactly how 
this process unfolds, though, is not always clear. 
Examples of boundary change include: the incorporation of a new city, county, township, special 
district, or other governmental unit (McCabe 2000
20
; Thurmaier and Wood 2004
21
); the 
annexation of unincorporated land by a pre-existing government (Brierly 2004)
22
; the 
consolidation of two or more governments into a single unit (Feiock and Carr 2000)
23
; and the 
legal dissolution of redundant governments (Carr 2004)
24
.  Typically, boundary change requires 
a concerted effort by public and private actors, as well as some involvement by the local 
electorate. 
The literature provides four explanations for the extent and frequency of local boundary change.  
The first explanation asserts that economic and demographic change will produce a demand for 
additional public services.  These service demands can be met by expanding the size of those 
local governments already responsible for service delivery, having municipalities annex any 
needy areas (Bollens 1961)
25
, incorporating new general-purpose governments to provide a 
complete range of services (Burns 1994)
26
, or forming special districts and quasi-governmental 










The second explanation claims that state-imposed restrictions upon general-purpose governments 
can both encourage and discourage boundary change.  Indeed, research indicates that state limits 
upon the ability of municipalities to impose property taxes (MacManus 1981)
31
 and create public 
debt (Sbragia 1996)
32
 sparked the proliferation of special districts during the 1950s and 1960s as 
local politicians created new districts to circumvent state restrictions and fund additional 
services.  There is also evidence of a positive relationship between state limits upon the power of 
municipalities to annex unincorporated areas and the number of special districts within a state 
(Heikkila and Ely 2003)
33
.  Under such limitations, unincorporated areas requiring additional 
government services cannot expect that their needs will be met via annexation by an already 
established municipality.  These areas are forced into forming additional special districts to 
alleviate their service demands. 
The third explanation proclaims that the creation of governmental units and other such boundary 
change is not merely an automatic response to economic and demographic fluctuations (Burns 
1994)
34
.  Instead, boundary change is often a political act intended to directly benefit a specific 
group of entrepreneurs.  This explanation notes that any group which instigates and successfully 




completes the process of incorporation is positioned to institutionalize their values within that 
new government, such as low taxes or the provision and exclusion of certain services.  Given 
these benefits, one would expect an unending series of competitions between various public and 
private actors to create additional governmental institutions.  However, the formation of a new 
government is not easily done.  Indeed, incorporation is often an expensive, time-consuming task 
with considerable risk of failure (Feiock and Carr 2000)
35
.  Most actors are better off waiting for 
someone else to assume this burden, since they will ultimately share in the general benefits 
provided by a new government anyway.  Such circumstances create a conundrum: while it is 
rational for actors to wait, this also ensures that no one actually attempts to incorporate a new 
government. 
 
One solution to this paralysis requires an entrepreneur with substantial resources to take on the 
costs associated with government formation (Burns 1994)
36
.  Such entrepreneurs are undaunted 
by the prospect of a costly failure and sees the possible institutionalization of their values as a 
terrific selective benefit.  The identification of such entrepreneurs is a source of considerable 
interest to researchers.  Burns emphasizes the role played by real-estate developers and industrial 





, and Feiock and Carr (2000)
39
 stress the importance of „public entrepreneurs.‟  
McCabe notes that “...public entrepreneurs – including those who work in universities, civic 
associations, and business – have been identified as having an interest in changing the existing 
local structure for delivering services” (2000, 124)
40
.  The creation of a new government is seen 
as one way of bringing about such change. 
The fourth explanation emphasizes the ways in which an initial instance of boundary change can 
reverberate throughout the local political system and cause other governments to change their 
own boundaries.  These reactions are often done in imitation of the initial boundary change, but 
can have a preemptive or defensive element as well.  For example, Burns (1994)
41
 described the 
relationship between the passage of state laws encouraging municipal annexation and the 
subsequent proliferation of newly incorporated municipalities.  She noted that “...where 
annexation was legal, and citizens thus had reason to worry about being annexed to existing 
cities with higher taxes” (1994, 80)
42
, citizens were likely to engage in „defensive‟ incorporations 
to prevent any unwanted takeovers.  Bauroth (2005)
43
 found a similar „defensive‟ dynamic 
amongst neighboring boroughs in Pennsylvania with the introduction of the municipal authority 
format during the 1940s. 
Economic Development Corporations in North Dakota and South Dakota 
The creation of an economic development corporation in North Dakota – known legally as a 
„certified nonprofit development corporation‟ – is a relatively straightforward legal process 
(North Dakota Century Code 2008, 10-33-124)
44
.   Any number of North Dakota residents can 
come together and file articles of incorporation with the secretary of state‟s office.  These articles 
specify the corporation name, the nature of its business, the principal place where it will transact 
that business, the names of its officers and directors, and the means through which the 
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corporation will be governed.  To qualify as a „certified nonprofit development corporation,‟ the 
incorporators must also provide a statement that the corporation “...has adopted a resolution to 
invest a majority of membership payments, dues, or contributions received in primary sector 
businesses” (North Dakota Century Code 2008, 10-33-124-2c)
45
.  This statement allows a new 
corporation considerable discretion as to how it will actually encourage economic development. 
Most corporations, though, engage in such activities as offering low-interest loans to new 
businesses, marketing the local economy to outside business interests, and overseeing employee 
training programs.  However, none of the corporation‟s income can be distributed directly to its 
members or governing officers. 
Certified nonprofit development corporations can receive income from a variety of public and 
private sources, but they generally rely upon the Certified Nonprofit Development Corporation 
Investment Credit for funding (North Dakota Office of State Tax Commissioner 2008)
46
.  The 
state allows an income tax credit of up to $2,000 to any individual, estate, trust, or corporation 
that buys a membership, pays dues, or otherwise contributes funds to a certified nonprofit 
development corporation (North Dakota Century Code 2008, 10-33-124-4)
47
. 
This study searched the North Dakota secretary of state‟s corporate registration records (2008)
48
 
to derive a list of all nonprofit corporations engaged in economic development activities, as well 
as their years of incorporation and central locations.  The corporations under examination here 
focus their efforts on areas less than the size of a county, typically cities and townships.  All 
nonprofit corporations devoted to low-income housing, though, were excluded from the 
analysis.  The data is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: New Economic Development Corporations in North Dakota by Year 




As can be seen, 109 nonprofit economic development corporations formed between 1946 and 
2006 in 44 of the state‟s 53 counties.  The creation of such corporations was once a rare event 
with only 15 EDCs incorporating between 1946 and 1969.  Twelve more corporations formed 
between 1970 and 1979, and an addition 23 EDCs between 1980 and 1989.  However, 1989 
marked a transition point with the creation of 5 EDCs.  The next year brought 14 new 
corporations, with a total of 46 corporations forming between 1990 and 1999. 
The incorporation of an economic development corporation in South Dakota is also an 
uncomplicated legal process (South Dakota Codified Laws 2008, 47-22)
49
.   Three or more South 
Dakota residents can file articles of incorporation of a non-profit corporation with the secretary 
of state‟s office.  These articles specify the corporation name, the nature of its business, the place 
where it will transact that business, its officers, and the means through which the corporation will 
be governed. 
However, most non-profits devoted to economic development are actually incorporated as what 
the state code calls „local industrial development corporations.‟  These corporations are 
specifically “...formed for the purpose of furthering the economic development of a community 
and its environs, and with authority to promote and assist in the growth and development of 
small business concerns in the areas covered by its operation.” (South Dakota Codified Laws 
2008, 7-29-24)
50
.  Incorporating as an industrial development corporation offers a number of 
benefits to a non-profit, such as: exemptions from local property taxes and certain state taxes; 
exemptions from certain fees and bonding requirements; and a formalized process of leasing 
property from a county (South Dakota Codified Laws 2008, Chapter 5)
51
.  Perhaps the most 
important benefit, though, is that the state and local governments perceive industrial 
development corporations as legitimate partners in developing the local economy.  This is a level 
of respect that regular non-profit corporations devoted to civic improvements do not necessarily 
receive. 
 
This study also searched the South Dakota secretary of state‟s corporate registration records 
(2008)
52
 to tabulate a list of nonprofit corporations engaged in economic development activities, 
as well as their years of incorporation and central locations.  These corporations focused their 
efforts on areas less than the size of a county, typically cities or a portion of the county.  The data 
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Figure 2 shows that 147 economic development corporations formed between 1946 and 2006 in 
60 of the state‟s 66 counties.  The creation of such corporations used to be a relatively rare event 
with just 22 EDCs incorporating between 1946 and 1969.  Thirty-one more corporations formed 
between 1970 and 1979, with an addition 36 EDCs between 1980 and 1989.  However, 1986 
marked a transition point with the creation of 7 EDCs.  Finally, a total of 40 corporations formed 
between 1990 and 1999. 
Explanations for the Uneven Proliferation of Economic Development Corporations in 
North Dakota and South Dakota: Model and Hypotheses 
The dependent variables in this study are the total number of economic development 
corporations created in North Dakota and South Dakota during the periods of 1987 – 1992 and 
1992 – 1997.  The study tests the extent to which the four general explanations for boundary 
change can account for the uneven proliferation of EDCs within the various local political 
systems.  Thus, the study is not so much concerned in why a specific, individual EDC arose.  
Instead, it is interested with how the many economic and political forces across a local political 
system encouraged or discouraged EDC formation.  Consequently, the study defines „local 
political system‟ as the individual county. 
 
 




The model used in this study is composed of four sets of independent variables, each set 
representing a general explanation for local boundary change: 
   New Economic Development Corporations = service demands + institutional  
  constraints upon local government + entrepreneurship + other local boundary changes. 
Some 23 of North Dakota‟s 53 counties experienced the creation of at least one EDC between 
1987 and 1992 while 21 counties saw at least one new EDC between 1992 and 1997.  Likewise, 
24 of South Dakota‟s 66 counties added at least one EDC between 1987 and 1992 while 15 
counties had at least one new EDC form between 1992 and 1997.  Given the number of counties 
in both states receiving a score of „zero‟ on the dependent variables, the data used throughout 
this study violates the normal distribution assumptions necessary for ordinary least squares 
regression.  The variances of the dependent variables are also larger than the means, which 
implies an over-dispersed count variable.  As a result, the study uses a negative binomial 
distribution to examine its hypotheses. 
  Hypothesis One: The greater the demand for local services within a county, the greater  
  the number of new EDCs. 
Counties experiencing economic and demographic change, whether positive or negative, will 
have to deal with fresh demands by business people, property owners, and residents for 
additional services.  These forceful demands can be met through the existing network of local 







).  However, government incorporation is often a long process that does not 
provide immediate relief to service demands (Burns 1994)
56
.  As a result, there will be a general 
incentive to maximize the contributions of the pre-existing governments in the hopes that this 
will be sufficient until more long-term solutions are available.  This incentive will lead to the 
formation of new economic development corporations to assist in the provision of services.  
 
Demand for additional services is represented by three independent variables: the first variable is 
Population Growth by county, defined as the percent change in population from 1982 to 1987 
and 1987 to 1992 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2001)
57
; the second variable is the Unemployment 
rate per county in 1986 and 1992 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1996)
58
; and the third variable is 
Percent Growth in Income, defined as the percent change in per capita personal income from 
1982 to 1987 and 1987 to 1992 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2001)
59
. 
  Hypothesis Two: The greater the institutional constraints upon local government within a  
  county, the greater the   number of new EDCs. 
The proliferation of special districts during the post-war era was driven, in part, by the desire of 





).  Counties and municipalities operating under statutes that limited their ability to 
annex land, create new debt, or raise property taxes would often form special districts to serve as 
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their proxies.  This study examines counties within two neighboring states, though, so it would 
seem that variations in state restrictions should not be much of an issue.  However, both states 
place strict limits on the extent to which municipalities, counties, and other local governments 
can tax property (North Dakota Century Code 2007
62
; South Dakota Codified Laws 2008
63
).  
Consequently, local politicians may try to circumvent these limits by encouraging the formation 
of economic development corporations. 
State constraints upon local governments is represented by Total Property Tax Revenues per 
capita in 1987 and 1992 by county.  These measures are derived from the 1987 and the 1997 





  Hypothesis Three: The greater the levels of local entrepreneurship within a county, the    
  greater the number of new EDCs. 
The process of creating a new governmental organization can be expensive, risky, and time-
consuming (Burns 1994)
66
.  Only entrepreneurial groups with considerable political and financial 
resources are likely to see this process through to a successful conclusion (Feiock and Carr 
2000)
67
.  These groups do not expend their resources just to make slight adjustments to the local 
political system, though.  Instead, they seek a reconfiguration of the existing governing 
arrangements to their own benefit.  Burns (1994)
68
 identified private real-estate developers and 
manufacturers as the most likely groups to push for boundary change.  Her research indicates 
that private developers call for the creation of special districts to provide services and 
infrastructure for their properties while manufacturers help incorporate municipalities to keep tax 
rates low.  There is evidence that these groups maintain some influence over these governments 
for many years after incorporation (Bauroth 2007)
69
. 
The measure of local entrepreneurship used in this study is derived from the U.S. Bureau of 
Census (2001)
70
: the Percentage of Local Earnings Derived from Finance, Insurance, and Real 
Estate in 1987 and 1992 for each county.  This measure is calculated by dividing Earnings in 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate with Total Earnings in All Industries. 
  Hypothesis Four: The greater the overall levels of boundary change within a county, the  
  greater the number of   new EDCs. 
Boundary change does not occur in isolation (Feiock and Carr 2001)
71
.  Shared and overlapping 
boundaries set the parameters for intergovernmental relationships so that one government‟s 
decision to extend or retract its boundaries reverberates throughout the local political system.  
Other governments may react by reconfiguring their own boundaries or otherwise enhancing 





).  Such a dynamic will lead to the creation of new EDCs as municipalities use all 
available options in their ongoing strategy to improve their positions. 
 




Boundary change is represented through Change in the Number of Special Districts by county 
from 1982 to 1987 and from 1987 to 1992.  The definition of a special district used in this study 
follows that of the U.S. Bureau of the Census:  
special district governments are independent, special-purpose governmental units 
(other than school district governments) that exist as separate entities with substantial 
administrative and fiscal independence from general-purpose governments...In order 
to be counted as a special district government, rather than be classified as a 
subordinate agency, an entity must possess three attributes: existence as an organized 
entity, governmental character, and substantial autonomy. (2002, vii)
74
. 
The study uses Bureau‟s Census of Governments data to identify the number of special districts 
in each county.  It should be emphasized that the Bureau does not consider North Dakota or 
South Dakota economic development corporations to be special districts (2002)
75
. 
A primary difference between the two states is the presence of Job Development Authorities in 
North Dakota.  In 1985, the North Dakota legislature gave county governments the authorization 
to levy a property tax of up to 4 mills for the purpose of encouraging job creation (North Dakota 
Century Code 2008)
76
.  However, the counties themselves do not maintain absolute control over 
these revenues.  Instead, a county seeking to levy such a tax must create a public agency called a 
jobs development authority, or JDA, to oversee its dispersal.  The intent of the legislature was to 
create an agency that would “...assist rural communities to diversify their economic bases so the 
communities would be less dependent on agriculture as the base of the communities‟ economies” 
(North Dakota Legislative Council 2007, 2)
77
.  The JDA would implement this policy, in part, by 
entering into contracts with local economic development corporations.  To account for this and 
other statutory differences, a dummy measure for „North Dakota county is included in the model 
as a control. 
Finally, the study includes the number of municipalities within a county for 1987 and 1992.  This 
measure also serves as a control for local population. 
Analysis 
 
While the literature recognizes the general importance of quasi-governmental organizations for 
state and local policy, empirical research is still quite limited.  The first step for this study, then, 
is to examine North Dakota and South Dakota on the relevant variables by county.  It should be 
emphasized that these figures are county means, not statewide averages.  The results are 
presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Measures by North Dakota and South Dakota counties  
  ND Counties SD Counties 
Mean Unemployment Rate, 1986 
   
6.90 4.85 
 Mean Population, 1987 12,474 10,546 
Mean Percentage Population Growth, 1982-1987   -5.16 -2.89 
Mean Percentage Population Growth, 1987-1992   -9.14 -2.69 
Mean Percentage Growth in Income, 1982-1987   8.79 19.26 
Mean Percentage Growth in Income, 1987-1992   7.78 13.07 
Mean Percentage of Local Earnings Derived from Finance, 
Insurance, and Real Estate, 1987 
4.12 3.75 
Mean Percentage of Local Earnings Derived from Finance, 
Insurance, and Real Estate, 1992 
3.40 3.23 
Mean Property Tax Revenues per capita, 1987 (1982 dollars) 
   
364.11 427.47 
Mean Property Tax Revenues per capita, 1992 (1982 dollars) 
   
393.08 423.29 
Mean Municipalities, 1987 6.91 4.68 
Mean Municipalities, 1992 6.87 4.70 
Mean Number of Special Districts, 1987 13.26 3.21 
Mean Change in Number of Special Districts, 1982-1987 0.21 0.20 
Mean Change in Number of Special Districts, 1987-1992 0.36 0.76 
Mean New Economic Development Corporations, 1987-1992 0.60 0.48 
Mean New Economic Development Corporations, 1992-1997 0.43 0.23 
Total Number of Counties 53 66 





As can be seen, North Dakota counties had an average population that was approximately 20 
percent larger than South Dakota counties.  However, North Dakota counties were also 
experiencing a more rapid decline in population.  Both sets of counties underwent a sizable 
growth in income, though it was greater in South Dakota.  North Dakota counties tended to have 
more municipalities and special districts, but were seeing smaller growth in their special district 
numbers.  South Dakota counties collected higher property tax revenues per capita, while a 
greater portion of local earnings in North Dakota counties were derived from the finance, 
insurance, and real estate industries.  Finally, North Dakota counties had more economic 
development corporations incorporate between 1992 and 1997 than South Dakota counties, 
though both underwent mean growth. 




These measures indicate that the economic and demographic condition were fairly volatile in 
both states during the period under study. 
Having examined conditions at the county level, the model can now be employed to consider the 
extent to which the four general explanations of local boundary change account for the uneven 
distribution of new EDCs by county.  The Negative Binomial Distribution results for 1987-1992 
and 1992-1997 are found in Table 2. 
Table 2: Explanations for the Creation of Economic Development Corporations in North 
Dakota and South Dakota counties, using Negative Binomial distributions. 
  New Economic Development 
Corporations, 1987-1992 
New Economic Development 
Corporations, 1992-1997 














   2.8794 * 
 (1.6097) 
Property Tax Revenues per capita (1982 
dollars) 




Percent of Local Earnings Derived from 













North Dakota dummy 
  
0.2508   
(0.3177) 
   0.8585 * 
 (0.4754) 








Scaled Deviance, Value/DF 1.0875 0.8431 
Log Likelihood -90.6840 -72.4642 
N 119 119 
      * = .1; ** = .05; *** = .01  Coefficient / (Standard Error)   
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The results indicate that the Unemployment Rate and Percent Population Growth did not have a 
significant influence upon the dependent variables for either period.  In addition, Percent Growth 
in Income had a barely significant, positive relationship with the creation of new EDCs during 
1992-1997.  Consequently, there is little support for Hypothesis One.  This implies that local 
demands for additional services did not drive the creation of additional EDCs in North Dakota 
and South Dakota during the 1980s and 1990s. 
However, Property Tax per Capita had a very significant, positive impact upon the number of 
new EDCs in 1987-1992.  After controlling for the rest of the model, counties experiencing a 
$100 increase in property taxes per capita will also see the creation of 0.11 more EDCs.  This 
result supports Hypothesis Two.  Thus, the apparent need by local politicians to circumvent state 
restrictions at the county level is associated with new EDCs.  Property tax per capita proved 
insignificant during 1992-1997, though. 
The Percentage of Local Earnings Derived from Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate was 
insignificant in both periods, which undercuts Hypothesis Three.  Thus, the presence of 
entrepreneurs with considerable resources and skills such as developers is not associated with 
change in EDC numbers across the local political system. 
The Boundary Change measures produced mixed results.  Change in the Number of Special 
Districts by county has a significant and positive association with the formation of EDCs for 
1987-1992.  Consequently, the addition of a single new special district is associated with the 
creation of an additional 0.31 EDCs during this period.  In addition, the number of municipalities 
within a county has a significant impact for 1987-1992: each additional municipality within a 
county is related to the formation of 0.095 new EDCs.  These results provide some support for 
Hypothesis Four: boundary change reverberates across the local political system and can bring 
about additional instances of boundary changes, such as the formation of quasi-governmental 
institutions.  However, both variables proved insignificant for 1992-1997. 
Finally, the North Dakota dummy variable was only significant during the period of 1992-1997.  




Shared and overlapping boundaries between local governments set the initial parameters for 
intergovernmental relationships within a county or metropolitan area (Feiock and Carr 2001)
80
.  
One government‟s decision to extend its boundaries is not a politically neutral event.  Instead, it 





).  The literature provides four general explanations for the prevalence of local boundary 
change: demographic and economic change produces strong demands for additional services; 
state statutory limits upon local government behavior forces local politicians into circumventing 
these statutes; resourceful public and private entrepreneurs instigate boundary change for their 




own advantage; and, a single instance of boundary change can reverberate throughout the local 
political system and bring about further boundary changes.  This study examined the ability of 
these explanations to account for the uneven proliferation of economic development corporations 
across North Dakota and South Dakota by county.  
Some important conclusions can be derived from the analysis.  First, unemployment and 
population growth had no impact upon the creation of economic development corporations.  
These results suggest that the creation and use of such quasi-governmental entities in North 
Dakota and South Dakota was not driven by in local service demands. 
Second, state constraints upon local government in terms of property taxes do affect the creation 
of additional EDCs.  It appears that the proliferation of EDCs was driven at least in part by a 
desire to circumvent state statutes. 
Third, the relative economic strength of finance, insurance, and real estate establishments has no 
impact upon EDC formation, at least in these two states. 
Finally, boundary change does not appear to occur in isolation.  The presence of many 
municipalities as well as the formation of an increasing number of special districts within a 
county encourages the further proliferation of EDCs, even after controlling for other relevant 
variables.  This finding indicates that the instability caused by such boundary change 
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